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Quantum Cryptography using entangled photons in energy-time Bell states
W. Tittel, J. Brendel, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin
Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, CH-1211, Geneva 4, Switzerland
We present a setup for quantum cryptography based on
photon pairs in energy-time Bell states and show its feasabil-
ity in a laboratory experiment. Our scheme combines the ad-
vantages of using photon pairs instead of faint laser pulses and
the possibility to preserve energy-time entanglement over long
distances. Moreover, using 4-dimensional energy-time states,
no fast random change of bases is required in our setup : Na-
ture itself decides whether to measure in the energy or in the
time base.
PACS Nos. 3.67.Dd, 3.67.Hk
Quantum communication is probably one of the most
rapidly growing and most exciting fields of physics within
the last years [1]. Its most mature application is quantum
cryptography (also called quantum key distribution), en-
suring the distribution of a secret key between two par-
ties. This key can be used afterwards to encrypt and
decrypt secret messages using the one time pad [2]. In
opposition to the mostly used ”public key” systems [2],
the security of quantum cryptography is not based on
mathematical complexity but on an inherent property of
single quanta. Roughly speaking, since it is not possible
to measure an unknown quantum system without mod-
ifying it, an eavesdropper manifests herself by introduc-
ing errors in the transmitted data. During the last years,
several prototypes based on faint laser pulses mimicking
single photons, have been developed, demonstrating that
quantum cryptography not only works inside the labo-
ratory, but in the ”real world” as well [1,3,4]. Besides,
it has been shown that two-photon entanglement can be
preserved over large distances [5], especially when being
entangled in energy and time [6]. As pointed out by Ek-
ert in 1991 [7], the nonlocal correlations engendered by
such states can also be used to establish sequences of cor-
related bits at distant places, the advantage compared to
systems based on faint laser pulses being the smaller vul-
nerability against a certain kind of eavesdropper attack
[8,9].
Besides improvements in the domain of quantum key
distribution, recent experimental progress in generat-
ing, manipulating and measuring the so-called Bell-states
[10], has lead to fascinating applications like quantum
teleportation [11], dense-coding [12] and entanglement
swapping [13]. In a recent paper, we proposed and tested
a novel source for quantum communication generating a
new kind of Bell states based on energy-time entangle-
ment [14]. In this paper, we present a first application,
exploiting this new source for quantum cryptography.
Our scheme follows Ekert’s initial idea concerning the
use of photon-pair correlations. However, in opposition,
it implements Bell states and can thus be seen in the
broader context of quantum communication. Moreover,
the fact that energy-time entanglement can be preserved
over long distances renders our source particulary inter-
esting for long-distance applications.
To understand the principle of our idea, we look at
Fig. 1. A short light pulse emitted at time t0 enters an
interferometer having a path length difference which is
large compared to the duration of the pulse. The pulse
is thus split into two pulses of smaller amplitudes, fol-
lowing each other with a fixed phase relation. The light
is then focussed into a nonlinear crystal where some of
the pump photons are downconverted into photon pairs.
Working with pump energies low enough to ensure that
generation of two photon pairs by the same as well as by
two subsequent pulses can be neglected, a created photon
pair is described by
|ψ 〉 = 1√
2
(
| s 〉A| s 〉B + eiφ| l 〉A| l 〉B
)
. (1)
| s 〉 and | l 〉 denote a photon created by a pump pho-
ton having traveled via the short or the long arm of the
interferometer, and the indices A, B label the photons.
The state (1) is composed of only two discrete emission
times and not of a continuous spectrum. This contrasts
with the energy-time entangled states used up to now
[7,15]. Please note that, depending on the phase φ, Eq.
(1) describes two of the four Bell states. Interchanging
| s 〉 and | l 〉 for one of the two photons leads to gener-
ation of the remaining two Bell-states. In general, the
coefficients describing the amplitudes of the | s 〉| s 〉 and
| l 〉| l 〉 states can be different, leading to nonmaximally
entangled states. However, in this article, we will deal
only with maximally entangled states. Behind the crys-
tal, the photons are separated and are sent to Alice and
Bob, respectively (see Fig.1). There, each photon trav-
els via another interferometer, introducing exactly the
same difference of travel times through one or the other
arm as did the previous interferometer, acting on the
pump pulse. If Alice looks at the arrival times of the
photons with respect to the emission time of the pump
pulse t0 – note that she has two detectors to look at–, she
will find the photons in one of three time slots. For in-
stance, detection of a photon in the first slot corresponds
to ”pump photon having traveled via the short arm and
downconverted photon via the short arm”. To keep it
short, we refer to this process as | s 〉P ; | s 〉A, where P
stands for the pump- and A for Alice’s photon. However,
the characterization of the complete photon pair is still
ambiguous, since, at this point, the path of the photon
having traveled to Bob (short or long in his interferome-
ter) is unknown to Alice. Fig. 1 illustrates all processes
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leading to a detection in the different time slots both at
Alice’s and at Bob’s detector. Obviously, this reasoning
holds for any combination of two detectors. In order to
build up the secret key, Alice and Bob now publicly agree
about the events where both detected a photon in one of
the satellite peaks – without revealing in which one – or
both in the central peak – without revealing the detec-
tor. This additional information enables both of them to
know exactly via which arm the sister photon, detected
by the other person, has traveled. For instance, to come
back to the above given example, if Bob tells Alice that
he detected his photon in a satellite peak as well, she
knows that the process must have been | s 〉p; | s 〉A| s 〉B.
The same holds for Bob who now knows that Alice pho-
ton traveled via the short arm in her interferometer. If
both find the photons in the right peak, the process was
| l 〉p; | l 〉A| l 〉B . In either case, Alice and Bob have corre-
lated detection times. The cross terms where one of them
detect a photon in the left and the other one in the right
satellite peak do not occur. Assigning now bitvalues 0
(1) to the short (long) processes, Alice and Bob finally
end up with a sequence of correlated bits.
Otherwise, if both find the photon in the central
slot, the process must have been | s 〉p; | l 〉A| l 〉B or
| l 〉p; | s 〉A| s 〉B. If both possibilities are indistinguish-
able, we face the situation of interference and the prob-
ability for detection by a given combination of detectors
(e.g. the ”+”-labeled detector at Alice’s and the ”–” la-
beled one at Bob’s) depends on the phases α, β and φ
in the three interferometers. The quantum mechanical
treatment leads to Pi,j =
1
2
(
1 + ijcos(α+ β − φ)) with
i,j = ±1 denoting the detector labels [14]. Hence, chos-
ing appropriate phase settings, Alice and Bob will always
find perfect correlations in the output ports. Either both
detect the photons in detector ”–” (bitvalue ”0”), or both
in detector ”+” (bitvalue ”1”). Since the correlations de-
pend on the phases and thus on the energy of the pump,
signal and idler photons, we refer to this base as the en-
ergy base (showing wave like behaviour), stressing the
complementarity with the other, the time basis (showing
particle like behaviour).
 
f
L
aser
t0
b
Bob
a
Alice
+
-
+
-
nonlinear
 crystal
tA - t0
A
li
ce
|sñp ,|sñA |lñp ,|lñA
|sñp ,|lñA ; |lñp ,|sñA
tB - t0
B
o
b
|sñp ,|lñB ; |l ñp ,|sñB
|lñp ,|lñB|sñp ,|sñB
FIG. 1. Schematics of quantum key distribution using en-
ergy-time Bell states.
Like in the BB84 protocol [16] it is the use of com-
plementary bases that ensures the detection of an eaves-
dropper [17]. If we consider for instance the most in-
tuitive intercept/resend strategy, the eavesdropper inter-
cepts the photons, measures them in one of the two bases
and sends new, accordingly prepared photons instead.
Since she never knows in which basis Bob’s measurement
will take place, she will in half of the cases eavesdrop
and resend the photons in the ”wrong basis” and there-
fore will statistically introduce errors in Bobs results, re-
vealing in turn her presence. For a more general treat-
ment of quantum key distribution and eavesdropping us-
ing energy-time complementarity, we refer the reader to
[18].
To generate the short pump pulses, we use a pulsed
diode laser (PicoQuant PDL 800), emitting 600ps
(FWHM) pulses of 655 nm wavelength at a repetition
frequency of 80 MHz. The average power is of ≈ 10 mW,
equivalent to an energy of 125 pJ per pulse. The light
passes a dispersive prism, preventing the small quantity
of also emitted infrared light to enter the subsequent
setup, and a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS), serving as
optical isolator. The pump is then focussed into a single-
mode fiber and is guided into a fiber optical Michelson
interferometer made of a 3 dB fiber coupler and chem-
ically deposited silver end mirors. The path length dif-
ference corresponds to a difference of travel times of ≈
1.2 ns, splitting the pump pulse into two, well seperated
pulses. The arm-length difference of the whole interfer-
ometer can be controlled using a pizoelectric actuator in
order to ensure any desired phase difference. Besides, the
temperature is maintained stable. In order to control the
evolution of the polarization in the fibers, we implement
three fiber-optical polarization controllers, each one con-
sisting of three inclinable fiber loops – equivalent to three
waveplates in the case of bulk optic. The first device
is placed before the interferometer and ensures that all
light, leaving the Michelson interferometer by the input
port will be reflected by the already mentioned PBS and
thus will not impinge onto the laser diode. The second
controller serves to equalize the evolution of the polariza-
tion states within the different arms of the interferome-
ter, and the last one enables to control the polarization
state of the light that leaves the interferometer by the
second output port. The horizontally polarized light is
now focussed into a 4x3x12 mm KNbO3 crystal, cut and
oriented to ensure degenerate collinear phasematching,
hence producing photon pairs at 1310 nm wavelength –
within the so-called second telecommunication window.
Due to injection losses of the pump into the fiber and
losses within the interferometer, the average power be-
fore the crystal drops to ≈ 1 mW, and the energy per
pulse – remember that each initial pump pulse is now
split into two – to ≈ 6 pJ. The probability for creation of
more than one photon pair within the same or within two
subsequent pulses is smaller than 1 %, ensuring the as-
sumption that lead to Eq. 1. Behind the crystal, the red
pump light is absorbed by a filter (RG 1000). The down-
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converted photons are then focussed into a fiber coupler,
separating them in half of the cases, and are guided to
Alice and Bob, respectively. The interferometers (type
Michelson) located there have been described in detail in
[6]. They consist of a 3-port optical circulator, providing
access to the second output arm of the interferometer,
a 3 dB fiber coupler and Faraday mirrors in order to
compensate any birefringence within the fiber arms. To
controll their phases, the temperature can be varied or
can be maintained stable. Overall losses are about 6 dB.
The path length differences of both interferometers are
equal with respect to the coherence length of the down-
converted photons – approximately 20 µm. In addition,
the travel time difference is the same than the one intro-
duced by the interferometer acting on the pump pulse. In
this case, ”the same” refers to the coherence time of the
pump photons, around 800 fs or 0.23 mm, respectively.
To detect the photons, the output ports are connected
to single-photon counters – passively quenched germa-
nium avalanche photodiodes, operated in Geiger-mode
and cooled to 77 K [6]. We operate them at dark count
rates of 30 kHz, leading to quantum efficiencies of ≈ 5
%. The single photon detection rates are of 4-7 kHz, the
discrepancy being due to different detection efficiencies
and losses in the circulators. The signals from the detec-
tors as well as signals being coincident with the emission
of a pump pulse are fed into fast AND-gates.
To demonstrate our scheme, we first measure the corre-
lated events in the time base. Conditioning the detection
at Alice’s and Bob’s detectors both on the left satellite
peaks, (| sp 〉,| sA 〉 and | sp 〉,| sB 〉, respectively) we count
the number of coincident detections between both AND-
gates, that is the number of triple coincidences between
emission of the pump-pulse and detections at Alice’s and
Bob’s. In subsequent runs, we measure these rates for the
right-right (| lp 〉,| lA 〉 AND | lp 〉,| lB 〉) events, as well as
for the right-left cross terms. We find values around 1700
coincidences per 100 sec for the correlated, and around
80 coincidences for the non-correlated events (table 1).
From the four times four rates –remember that we have
four pairs of detectors–, we calculate the different quan-
tum bit error rates QBER, which is the ratio of wrong
to detected events. We find values inbetween 3.7 and 5.7
%, leading to a mean value of QBER for the time base
of (4.6 ±0.1)%.
In order to evaluate the QBER in the energy base, we
condition the detection at Alice’s and Bob’s on the cen-
tral peaks. Changing the phases in any of the three inter-
ferometers, we observe interference fringes in the triple
coincidence count rates (Fig.2). Fits yield visibilities of
89.3 to 94.5 % for the different detector pairs (table 2).
In the case of appropriatly chosen phases, the number
of correlated events are around 800 in 50 sec, and the
number of errors are around 35. From these values, we
calculate the QBERs for the four detector pairs. We
find values inbetween 2.8 and 5.4 %, leading to a mean
QBER for the energy base of (3.9±0.4) %. Note that
this experiment can be seen as a Franson-type test of
Bell inequalities as well [15,19]. From the mean visibil-
ity of (92.2±0.8)%, we can infer to a violation of Bell
inequalities by 27 standard deviations.
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FIG. 2. Results of the measurement in the energy basis.
The different mean values are due to different detector effi-
ciencies
Like in all experimental quantum key distribution
schemes, the found QBERs are non-zero, even in the
absence of any eavesdropping. Nevertheless, they are
still small enough to guarantee the detection of an eaves-
dropper attack, allowing thus secure key distribution. in-
equality The remaining ≈ 4% are due to accidental co-
incidences from uncorrelated events at the single pho-
ton detectors, a not perfectly localized pump pulse, non-
perfect time resolution of the photon detectors, and, in
the case of the energy basis, non-perfect interference.
Note that the last mentioned errors decrease at the same
rate as the number of correlated events when increas-
ing the distance between Alice and Bob (that is when
increasing the losses). In contrast to that, the number
of errors due to uncorrelated events (point 1) stays al-
most constant since it is dominated by the detector noise.
Thus, the QBER increases with distance, however, only
at a small rate since this contribution was found to be
small. Experimental investigations show that introduc-
ing 6 dB overall losses – in the best case equivalent to 20
km of optical fiber – leads to an increment of only around
1%, hence to a QBER of 5-6%. Besides detector noise,
another major problem of all quantum key distribution
schemes developed up to now is stability, the only excep-
tion being [3]. In order to really implement our setup
for quantum cryptography, the interferometers have to
be actively stabilized, taking for instance advantage of
the free ports. The chosen passive stabilization by con-
trolling the temperature is not sufficient to ensure stable
phases over a long time.
To conclude, we presented a new setup for quantum
cryptography using Bell states based on energy-time en-
tanglement, and demonstrated its feasability in a lab-
oratory experiment. We found bit rates of around 33
Hz and quantum bit error rates of around 4 % which is
low enough to ensure secure key distribution. Besides
a smaller vulnerability against eavesdropper attacks, the
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advantage of using discrete energy-time states, up to di-
mension 4, in our scheme, is the fact that no fast change
between non-commuting bases is necessary. Nature itself
chooses between the complementary properties energy
and time. Furthermore, the recent demonstration that
energy-time entanglement can be preserved over long dis-
tances [6] shows that this scheme is perfectly adapted to
long-distance quantum cryptography.
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++ +– –+ – –
sP sA&sP sB 278±6 197±5 187±5 147±4
lP lA&lP lB 304±7 201±5 200±5 148±5
sP sA&lP lB 11±0.8 10.4±0.8 9.2±0.7 9.4±0.7
lP lA&sP sB 11.2±0.4 8.6±0.4 9.1±0.4 8.5±0.4
QBER [%] 3.7±0.2 4.6±0.2 4.5±0.2 5.7±0.3
TABLE I. Results of the measurement in the time ba-
sis. The different coincidence count rates are due to different
quantum efficiencies of the detectors, and the slight asymme-
try in the correlated events can be explained by the non-equal
transmission probabilities within the interferometers.
++ +– –+ – –
Visibility [%] 92.5±1.8 92.6±1.4 89.3±1.9 94.5±1.6
max. 518±13 416±8 359±9 279±7
min. 20±5 16±3 20±4 8±2
QBER [%] 3.7±0.9 3.7±0.7 5.3±1 2.8±0.8
TABLE II. Results of the measurement in the energy-basis.
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